President Thabo Mbeki was ultimately his own worse enemy. These are the five cardinal errors which led to his downfall...
1. THE CONTINUATION OF LIBERATION POLITICS IN AN OPEN, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Mbeki, who spent decades in the smoke-filled rooms of exile politics where everything was done on a “need-to-know” basis and where democracy was often sublimated to the security needs of the movement, failed to adapt to the new politics required of the open, democratic political environment in post-1994 South Africa. Ironically, Nelson Mandela, who spent decades in prison, was much more adept. After an unsteady start, he quickly understood that politics in a democracy requires leaders to step into the world that their supporters occupy. By donning his trademark shirt and offering an open, ready wit to world leaders and school children alike, Mandela won the battle of public opinion. Mbeki, on the other hand, was mistrustful of the media, saw agendas where there were none. Instead of engaging with the cameras, he retreated to a weekly Internet column which hurt his image badly. It gave the world insight into his paranoid thinking, pettiness and rancour. He would frequently single out influential individuals for ridicule. This sort of ad-hominem humiliation of an opponent might have gone down a treat in Lusaka, but it didn’t play in an open society looking for post-Mandela leadership.
2. THE APPOINTMENT OF POOR QUALITY ADVISERS
Mbeki went on to surround himself with advisers who fed his political weaknesses instead of ameliorating them. Chief among these was Essop Pahad, an old friend from exile who was made Minister in the presidency. If Mbeki misunderstood the media and how to build a successful public image, Pahad actively sought to alienate public opinion. He harangued journalists, sometimes with foul language, pointed his fingers at them and even famously sought to “bring down” the Sunday Times by withdrawing government advertising. Then there was Frank Chikane, director general in the Presidents office. Although an effective administrator, he was unable or unwilling to bring light to bear on the presidency. Mbeki’s powerful legal adviser, Mojanku Gumbi came from the radical Azapo party, a left wing organisation which was implacably opposed to racial reconciliation. Mbeki’s austere, opinionated and nit-picking spokesman, Mukoni Ratshitanga, was not a persuasive salesman. Surrounded by yes-men who fed his weakness for conspiracy, Mbeki was a closed book to the nation. Stoic, wooden appearances on SABC television did not repair the damage.
3. MAKING MORTAL ENEMIES OF BIG POWER BROKERS IN THE ANC
It is inevitable that a political leader will make political enemies on his way to the top. Once there, he ought to work hard to bring them into the fold and to offer them a piece of the leadership sunshine. Not so with Mbeki. Once in office, he set about systematically alienating some very powerful figures in the ANC. Cyril Ramaphosa, who could have been offered a senior position, perhaps deputy president, foreign minister, or finance minister, was cut out of the Mbeki power circle. He left politics to build a massive business empire. He remained extremely popular in the ANC, and retained trade union connections from his days as secretary general of the National Union of Mineworkers. Then there was Matthews Phosa, the unsuccessful premier of Mpumalanga, who was iced out of politics. He went on to spend his waking hours - perhaps even his sleeping hours - dreaming of Mbeki’s downfall. Also thrown out into the cold was Tokyo Sexwale, the powerful and extremely popular premier of Gauteng. Then there was Zuma himself. Even prior to the corruption charges which led Mbeki to fire him as deputy president, Mbeki alienated Zuma who was forced to make a cringeworthy public pledge of loyalty. Ramaphosa, Phosa and Sexwale were bizarrely accused of plotting his downfall and an official police investigation was instituted into their behaviour. This was a moment of political madness which set the ANC hierarchy against Mbeki. Mbeki failed to find a way of keeping left-leaning leaders such as Cosatu’s Zwelinzima Vavi and the SACP’s Blade Nzimande inside the establishment tent.
4. BAD CABINET APPOINTMENTS
Mbeki’s Cabinet appointments appeared to based on political loyalty rather than competence. While Finance Minister Trevor Manuel stands out as a successful appointment this was perhaps because he was allowed to forge a strong direction based on powerful technical advice. Perhaps he posed no political threat as the ANC has made it clear it will only countenance an African candidate for the presidency. Mbeki’s worst appointment was the selection of Manto Tshabalala-Msimang as Health Minister. She drove a deep wedge between government and those working in NGOs to fight Aids with an obstinate refusal to roll-out anti-retroviral drugs, even when ordered to do so by the courts. When government finally came around to dealing with this issue, Mbeki was a figure of derision and was even described as genocidal. Mbeki’s healthy contrarianism had morphed into unhealthy skepticism and his public image suffered. Then there was the decision place the statist Alec Erwin in charge of public utilities badly in need of reform and private sector investment. Instead of bringing market efficiencies to bear in keeping with Manuel’s policy approach, Erwin rolled back the clock, stopped privatisation and empowered inefficient bureaucracies. The result was that Eskom was hopelessly unable to respond to growing demand for electricity powered by South Africa’s higher-than-expected rate of economic growth. Electricity blackouts harmed growth and severely damaged South Africa as an investment destination. Erwin’s response was to threaten greater state involvement in the economy, to hike the cost of electricity and to deny anything was wrong. Mbeki, who had shown a great deal of Machiavellian guile in dispatching his political enemies now seemed strangely incapable of acting against his errant ministers.
5. AN OVER-EMPHASIS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mbeki spent his final years in office totally absorbed by the Zimbabwean crisis, even as his enemies grew bolder and began to plot his early exit from office. Make no mistake, Mbeki’s achievement in getting Zimbabwe’s president, Robert Mugabe, and opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to the negotiation table was a momentous achievement. But it is by no means certain that the deal will stick. And, in order to bring Mugabe to the table, Mbeki had to sacrifice a big part of his credibility. Time after time, he was pictured holding hands with Mugabe, bedecked in garlands of matching flowers and grinning uncomfortably. Even as the deal was signed, Mugabe delivered a rambling testimony to Mbeki’s statesmanship. It was not the sort of ringing endorsement anyone would want. Mbeki was distracted by Zimbabwe at the expense of his domestic political agenda and this may have contributed to his failure to manage crises around electricity and crime which were uppermost in the minds of his citizens.
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